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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

FRED R. LAW and
)
GERTRUDE R. LAW,
·
.
husband and wife,·
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
\

vs.

\

Case
No. 9333

UINTA OIL REFINING COMPANY,
a corporation, and
UTAH COOPERATIVE
ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

FACTS
Plaintiffs in this case were Mr. and Mrs. Law, but
Law died after the action was filed and before trial.
Mrs. Law, as Administratrix of her deceased husband's
estate, was substituted in his place.
~Ir.
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It was stipulated by the parties during the trial that
the resultant damage to plaintiffs was in the sum of
$46,119.11.
The jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants and assessed the damages at
the stipulated sum of $46,119.11. Judgment on the verdict was thereupon entered in favor of the plaintiffs in
the amount of $46,119.11, with interest at six per cent'
(6%) from September 19, 1957, to date of entry of judgment, April20, 1960, in the sum of $4,381.27, together with
costs in the amount of $134.00.
Defendants denied responsibility for the explosion
and fire, and it was on this issue that the jury ruled
against the defendants. However, defendants contended
at trial and now again contend on this appeal that the
plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving that negligence of the defendants caused the explosion and fire to
occur. In fact, defendants insist that plaintiffs never
offered any evidence of causation chargeable to defendants. Now let's review the important facts as shown by
the record.
Defendants, pursuant to an order from plaintiffs delivered white gasoline in bulk to plaintiffs on September
19, 1957. This gasoline as brought to plaintiffs' place by
defendants in a tractor and tanker trailer (Tr. 25). The
trailer was backed into the place of delivery by defendants' employee, Webb (Tr. 58). Webb asked plaintiffs'
employee, Shaw, where to unload the gasoline. Shaw re2
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plied that he didn't know, so Webb asked Burdick, another employee of plaintiff, where to unload. (Tr. 58)
Burdick showed Webb where to back in to unload, and
Webb backed in as directed. (Tr. 69) Burdick instructed
Webb how to connect the hoses and unload the gasoline,
and Burdick opened the appropriate valves and turned
on the switch to activate the motor and pump. (Tr. 77)
Webb hooked up the tanker to unload it and then asked
Burdick if it was properly hooked up. Burdick inspected
it and advised Webb that it was hooked up properly. ( Tr.
69) Burdick suggested to Webb that he should check the
tank to see if it was draining. (Tr. 77) Webb broke the
seal on the hatch of the tanker trailer and announced
that it was draining okay. (Tr. 78-79) Burdick said it appeared to be properly connected up for pumping operation from the trailer tank into the storage tank. (Tr. 78)
No fuel was leaking from any connections and there was
no odor of gasoline fumes or anything unusual observed
by Burdick. (Tr. 78) The switch to turn on the electric
pump motor was on the outside of the storage tank building. Some time after Webb asked Shaw where to unload
the gasoline, Shaw left the station to order sandwiches
for himself and Burdick at the adjacent cafe. ( Tr. 61)
While he was ordering the sandwiches Shaw saw Webb
in the cafe drinking a cup of coffee. (Tr. 62) Shaw did
not wait for the sandwiches, but Burdick came over for
them about fifteen or twenty minutes after Shaw had
ordered them. ( Tr. 71) Burdick saw Webb sitting at the
counter in the cafe when he picked up the sandwiches.
( Tr. 71) In going to the cafe and returning to the station Burdick did not see any gasoline on the hard-surfaced
3
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area or in the line of his path, (Tr. 71) and Shaw did not
see any gaoline or smell any gasoline fumes, while he
was en route to and from the cafe. (Tr. 61) Shaw and
Burdick had just finished their lunch when the first explosion occurred and fire started. ( Tr. 72)
Olsen, a service station operator located about a block
and a half north of the site of the fire, was driving northerly towards his own station when he passed "Oil City"
(the site of the fire) and noticed gasoline running down
the curb along the highway. This was before the explosion and fire. He said it was coming from the storage
tank area and running downhill. He identified it as gasoline by the smell and the vapors arising therefrom. (Tr.
83) Olsen said the gasoline was flowing for about 350
feet in distance, and though he knew it to be gasoline
and to be flowing from a certain area he drove on to his
own place of business without stopping, (Tr. 85-86) and
just as he was getting out of his car he heard an explosion. (Tr. 84)
Mr. Stanfield, an automotive repairman and mechanic
said that as he left his place of business for lunch he saw
smoke starting to raise from the direction of ''Oil City.''
( Tr. 89) As they approached "Oil City" he saw fire in
the gutter continuous up to the back of the tanker from
somewhere near the billboard. (Tr. 90)
Mr. Marx, an employee of the Price School Board,
was eating lunch in the cafe adjacent to "Oil City"
when he heard the explosion and turned and saw the
4
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flames. As he left the cafe he heard a cry and then saw
a man coming out in the flame from the area just on the
other side of the tanker from in between the tanker and
the end of the building or service station. (Tr. 93-94)
The man coming out of the fire was the driver of the
gasoline tanker, Mr. Webb. (Tr. 99) Mr. Marx ran to
Mr. Webb and assisted him as best he could, wrapping
a blanket around him to put orit the fire and getting him
out of the flames. About all Webb said which could be
understood was that he was in so much plain he asked
to be killed. ( Tr. 93) He never said how the fire started.
(Tr. 94) Mr. Webb died (Tt. 76) and no one offered any
other testimony about any statements made by Webb before his death.
Several of the witnesses called by plaintiffs (Law,
Burdick, Gilson) testified in some detail about the physical layout of the storage building and tank into which
the gasoline was being pumped. The building itself was
corrugated tin on three sides and the roof, and cinder
block on the fourth side. It was loosely put together.
(Tr. 13) The storage tank inside this building was steel
with dimensions of six feet high by six feet wide by
twelve feet long. It sat substantially on the floor of the
storage area so that the top of it was six feet off the
ground. (Tr. 46) The tank was sealed all around except
for a welded 2V2-inch diameter vent· which protruded
2% inches beyond the top of the tank, and to which a
rigid pipe was attached which extended upwards about
2% feet above the tin roof. (Tr. 20, 24, 43, 73-74 and
78-79 and 106) There was a hole in the roof much larger
5
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than the vent pipe, the hole being about six or eight inches
in diameter. (Tr. 74) The electric motor which operated
the pump to fill and drain this tank was located on the
ground, inside the storage building at the northwest corner of the tank. ( Tr. 46) Except for the holes in the
vent and the pipes from the valve controls the tank was
completely sealed so that the only way it could be overflowed would be to gusher it out of the top of the vent
under pumping pressure. ( Tr. 106)
Plaintiff rested without any witness ever giving any
evidence of what caused the explosion and fire to occur.
Neither Shaw, Burdick, Olsen, Stansfield, Marx, nor Gilson, plaintiffs' remaining witnesses, offered any evidence
of causation of the fire or explosion.
Not one witness called by plaintiffs in putting on
their case in chief offered any evidence as to the cause of
the explosion or fire. In fact, the only discussion of this
point by any of plaintiffs' witnesses was plaintiff Law's
evidence as follows :
'' Q. Did you know what caused the

explosion~

''A. No, I don't.

"Q. That is, where the spark came

from~

"A. No, I don't." (Tr. 34)
Immediately after plaintiff rested defendants moved
the court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
under the law and facts, plaintiffs showed no basis for
relief. Counsel stated in making his motion that the roost
6
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and best that can be said as to defendants "responsibility is the wildest type of speculation and conjecture."
(Tr. 96 and 107) The court denied this motion, thus compelling defendants to proceed. (Tr. 96)
Defendants' witnesses offered the following word
picture:
An explosion followed by :fire occurred while Mr.
Prazen was eating in the adjacent cafe. He ran out and
saw Mr. Webb, his clothing afire, come out of the fire area.
.Mr. Prazen and Mr. Marx grabbed Mr. Webb, wrapping
him in a blanket and taking him to the hospital. The :fire
was coming from between the tank and the service station building. (Tr. 109)
Mr. Davies, called by defendants, testified that he
was a diesel mechanic and service station attendant employed about one block from ''Oil City.'' As he was passing ''Oil City'' in his car he heard a loud but muffled
explosion "like it came from within a building." He
noticed the :fire, and being afraid of further explosions he
drove on a short distance and stopped oncoming traffic.
After doing this Mr. Davies walked back up to ''Oil City.''
~lr. Davies was asked whether, as he walked back up, he
ran into any :fire along the highway. He answered that
the :fire was starting to run from the front of the storage
area down the gutter, but at that time it was just in front
of the station. ( Tr. 111)
Mr. Mills, Fire Chief, Price, Utah, testified that he
heard the muffled explosion, and shortly thereafter
7
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(about five to seven minutes) received a fire call. He
took the fire truck to the scene of the fire arriving there
about seven or eight minutes after the receiptof the fire
call. Thus he arrived at the fire about twelve to fifteen minutes after the explosion. (Tr. 114) There was no fire up
and down the street when he arrived, only five to ten feet
in front of the building. (Tr. 114)

Mr. Hatch, Assistant Manager, Uinta Oil Refining
Co., testified that he was in Salt Lake City when the explosion and fire occurred, but that he was advised by
telephone and immediately left for Price, arriving there
between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., that day. (Tr. 117) He examined the trailer which delivered the gasoline to ''Oil
City" and found it to be entirely dry of white gasoline.
From an examination of the company records, Mr. Hatch
testified that 2137 gallons of white gasoline had been in
the trailer for delivery. (Tr. 119) When he examined
the trailer the fire valve and the rising stem valve were
both closed, and the hatch covering was also closed. (Tr.
120) Mr. Hatch testified that there was a well-recognized
custom in regard to unloading operations, which custom is
for the driver to position his trailer, and hook up his unloading hoses. The station attendant is then asked to open
the loading hatch and break the seals, and check the fluid
level of the trailer. After that is completed the custom is
that the driver has no more to do with the unloading.
(Tr. 121) The station attendant or operator starts the
pumping operations under this custom. (Tr. 122) On
cross-examination, Mr. Hatch testified that he didn't
know whether any of these customs were actually fol8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lowed on this particular day - and he didn't know
whether all of the gasoline was actually emptied from
the trailer into the storage tank, but that the trailer was
empty when he examined it. ( Tr. 122)
Dr. Cook, Professor of metallurgy and director of
the institute of metals and explosive research at the University of Utah, was next called by the defendants as an
expert witness. His special training and experience in
the :field of explosives includes:
''A. Upon graduating from Yale, I was a research chemist on explosives for Dupont Company
in Gibbstown, New Jersey, for ten years. And then
after being at the University of Utah as professor
of metallurgy for four years I set up, at the request of the U.S. Navy, the institute of metals and
explosives research. At that time it was known
as the explosives research group at the University
of Utah, and since then we have carried out a large
Government project on explosives. In the four
years between my employment with Dupont and
setting up this institute, I served as a consultant
and expert witness on the Texas City explosion
case. On the railroad reparations cases. On Riss
and Company, petitioners for transportation of
explosives, and a number of other federal cases
having to do with explosives business.''
Dr. Cook then testified that five very significant facts
were evident from an examination of the evidence in this
case. These five significant facts were:
1. Where the initial or more powerful explosion
occurred - i. e., in the region of the storage
tank. ( Tr. 125-126)
9
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2. The vent pipe found on top of the storage tank
after the explosion was not attached at the
time of the explosion as witnessed by the erosion of the female threads, instead of the shearing of them. (Tr. 127-128)
3. The top of the storage tank had been bulged
up and outward, indicating an explosion had
occurred inside the tank, but it was a less powerful explosion than had occurred outside the
tank. (Tr. 128-129)
4. A single phase General Electric motor unprotected for sparking was located next to the storage tank, inside the storage shed. This is extremely hazardous for use around gasoline, as
sparks from such a motor can ignite gasoline
vapor air mixture. Dr. Cook testified that a
three phase non-explosion vapor proof motor
without exposure of sparks was required for
operational conditions such as involved herein.
(Tr.129).
5. The corrugated sheet metal forming the wall
next to the storage tank was burned on the inside and not the outside. ( Tr. 129)
From these five evidentiary facts Dr. Cook concluded
that the first main explosion occurred in the region of
the storage tank, inside the storage- building, blasting outward. ( Tr. 129) Two factors must be present in order
for an explosion to occur involving white gasoline. First,
the gasoline must vaporize and reach a certain level
called the lower explosion limit, a suitable mixture of
vaporized gasoline in the air ; and second there must be
a source of ignition. Unvaporized white gasoline will

10
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ignite, but not explode. A temperature of six or seven
hundred degrees Fahrenheit is required to ignite this
mixture, and a spark from a motor like the one present
was adequate to ignite the mixture if the mixture was
in the proper range. He said the conditions were right
for an explosion. Filling a practically empty tank to the
two-thirds level would flush out two-thirds of the vapors.
Vapors being heavier than air, would roll off the tank
(no vent pipe attached to carry them outside the building) and the only place they could accumulate without
mixing with air would be on the side of the tank next
to the building where there would be very little ventilation. (Tr. 130-131) Dr. Cook said that a spark from the
electric motor was a very likely probable cause of ignition, that he saw no other evidence of any other source,
although there could have been other sources, but none
were found. The electric motor was completely adequate source and a very likely one. In view of the particular proximity to the main part of the explosion and
all other facts being considered it was his opinion that
sparks from the motor were the cause of the explosion.
(Tr. 131)
On cross-examination, Dr. Cook testified that he was
still convinced the explosion had occurred as he had previously indicated. (Tr. 140) He agreed with counsel for
the plaintiff that if there were any wind blowing and the
Yent pipe was attached, that the fumes would be carried
a:way so that they could not come back down through
the six-inch hole in the roof and get over back by the
motor. (Tr. 141) He said this was highly unlikely and it
11
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was his opinion that the: vent pipe had been left off, caus
ing the explosion as he had described it. (Tr. 141)
Following this testimony it was stipulated that ·the
capacity of the storage tank was 3240 gallons. After introducin~ certain colored picture slides, defendants rested.
Plaintiffs then offered certain rebutta1 evidence, first
from Mr. Leavitt, a distributor for Standard Oil Company of California. Mr. Leavitt said it was the general
custom for the tank truck operator to remain in the immediate area of the tank truck while it is dumping. {Tr.
148) Leavitt said there was no custom with respect to
what the operator of the service station does when deliveries are made. (Tr. 149)
Dr. Bryner, Professor of chemistry at B. Y. U., in
Provo was called as a rebuttal witness by the plaintiffs.
He was asked to assume as facts, most of the physical
evidence introduced at the trial plus the assumption that
there was an extension of the vent stub which sticks out
of the storage tank on the top, a rigid vent pipe extension,
which extended through the roof from one to three feet,
and that there was a breeze blowing during unloading
operations. Assuming these and the many other recited
facts he said it was his opinion that the gas fumes resulting from pumping gasoline into the storage tank while
unloading the trailer would not have been responsible for
the explosion. Next he was asked to assume that there was
no extension on the vent stub. He again concluded that
the fumesfrom the vent would not have accumulated and

12
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been ignited by the motor. (Tr. 155-158) Dr. Bryner
concluded from the pictures of the fire that there was a
breeze from the northwest. (Tr. 159) He also said that
heat from the sun would tend to warm the air under the
tin roof and because of radiation the air movement would
be upward. (Tr. 159) Dr. Bryner concluded from the
photographs of the fire that the explosion took place in
the vicinity of the tank but outside of the storage building. (Tr. 163)
On cross-examination, Dr. Bryner said there were
two or three explosions. (Tr. 165) After the first explosion there was no pipe on the vent stub as the jet fire
was emitted from below the roof level. ( Tr. 167) He concluded that there was no pipe screwed onto the vent stub
otherwise there would have been a stripping of the
threads if it had been blown off by the explosion. (Tr.
169) From all Dr. Bryner knew about the evidence in this
case it was his opinion that the vent pipe was not screwed
onto the stub. (Tr. 169) Dr. Bryner said he didn't think
an explosion would occur because of sparks from the particular motor involved as long as the motor was running.
It will spark while starting or stopping only. (Tr. 170)
On cross-examination Dr. Bryner reversed his direct testimony and concluded that the explosion occurred inside
the storage building, instead of outside. (Tr. 172-173) Dr.
Bryner was asked what he thought was the source of the
volatile vapors inside the storage building. He satid there
were two possible sources, either a leaky fitting or a poor
cownection on the pump. (Tr.177) One source was as good
as the other as he didn't know which one was correct.
13
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(Tr. 177) Dr. Bryner found no evidence that gasoline had
been forced by pumping, to overflow through the vent
op top of the tank. (Tr. 179) Dr. Bryner was asked if he
had an opinion as to the source of the ignition of the
vapors. He said he would not venture am opinion on
just exactly how ignition took place, that there were several ways it could have occurred, but that it would be
conjecture amd speculation to assume an.y one source.
(Tr. 182) The motor could be a possible source. (Tr. 185)
Dr. Bryner agreed that in most of the pumps and service
stations vapor-proof motors are used. (Tr. 184)
Dr. Cook testified on re-direct examination that the
motor shown by Exhibit D-25 would give off sparks while
it is in operation. ( Tr. 190)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AND
DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE.

PoiNT

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL
EVIDENCE AND IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1, DIRECTING THE JURY TO RETURN A DIRECTED
VERDICT IN BEHALF OF APPELLANT.
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PoiNT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.6 (R. 43), TO THE GIVING OF
WHICH APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND
WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

''If you find and believe by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the escape of white
gasoline from any of the facilities used in transferring the same from the trailer tank of the
Defendants to the tank of the Plaintiffs resulted
from negligence on the part of Clayton Webb,
the employee of the Defendants, and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of one or more
explosions and fire resulting in damage to the
Plaintiffs, it is of no consequence that you do not
determine the exact point at which the gasoline
escaped, nor the exact manner in which it was
ignited. If your minds are so satisfied by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, then you should
find a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and
against the Defendants unless your minds are
also satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence in one or more of the particulars
set forth in Instruction No. 3. ''
PoiNT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTION NO. 9 (R. 35), TO WHICH FAILURE
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH
READS AS FOLLOWS:

''Based upon the commonly known fact that
the instinct for self-preservation is such that
persons use ordinary and reasonable care for
their own safety, the law permits you to assume
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. that Clayton Webb, deceased, at the time of and
immediately preceding the incident in question,
-was exercising due care for his own safety. You
may make findings in accordance therewith un.less you are persuaded from a preponderance of
the evidence that he was guilty of negligence as
·--elsewhere in these instructions defined.''
POlNT

v

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S -REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTION NO .. 10 (R. 36), TO WHICH FAILURE
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH
READS AS FOLLOWS:

''You are instructed that where the precise
cause of an accident on the whole evidence is left
to conjecture or speculation, and which may be
reasonably attributed to causes over which this
defendant had no control, as to a cause for which
this defendant would be responsible, then and in
that event the plaintiff has failed to sustain its
burden of proof, and if such you find the fact
to be your verdict should be in favor of defendant and against the laintiff, no cause of action."

ARGUMENT
PorNr

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AND
DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE.
POINT

II

,THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VER-
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DICT MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL
EVIDENCE AND IN FAILING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1, DIRECTING THE JURY TO. RETURN A DIRECTED
VERDICT IN BEHALF OF APPELLANT.
Points Nos. I and II will be argued together for the
reason that both points involve substantially the same
argument on both the facts and the law.
The erroneous application of the facts and the law
in this case is clearly shown by the trial court's decision
and order filed April 19, 1960 (R. 66-67). The court's
decision is as follows :
''Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence
does not disclose the manner in which gasoline or
vapors arising therefrom were ignited, and notwithstanding the fact that the jury might on the
evidence conclude that sparks from the motor provided by the Plaintiffs for operating the pump
used in transferring the gasoline from the Defendants' tanker to the storage tank of the Plaintiffs
might have ignited the gasoline or vapors therefrom, I conclude that a jury may without speculation and conjecture conclude: That the standard of
care required in transferring the gasoline from the
trailer tank of the Defendants to the storage tank
of the plaintiffs required that the agent of the Defendants remain at all times within such proximity
of the unloading operations that he could give immediate attention to any failure in the instrumentalities involved; that the agent of the Defendants
started the pump, and after it was started left
the scene of the unloading operation and went to
a nearby restaurant and that while he was not
present at the unloading operation gasoline es17
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caped and flowed a dist(J!Ybce of from 200 to 350
feet from the storage tarnk; that had the defend·
ants' a,gent rem.a,ined in view of the 11/Yiloading operations the escape of gasoline could have been
stopped or prevented; that it was the escape of
gasoline that was the proximate cause of the explosion and resulting fire." (Emphasis supplied)

It is evident from the court's decision that he assumed (a) that the defendant's employee was not present at the unloading operation while gasoline escaped,
and that (b) had he been there personally the escape of
gasoline could have been stopped or prevented.
There is absolutely no evidence upon which to base
these assumptions; and it further assumes that if the employee of the appellant had been near his equipment that
he could have done something to have stopped or prevented the explosion. The facts in the case show that at
the time of the explosion the employee Clayton Webb
was with his equipment. This is shown by the fact that
at the time of the explosion he was seen running out from
between his truck and the building. There is no evidence
of any kind from which it could he determined how long
he had been at that place. It is true that at the commencement of the unloading operation he was seen having a cup of coffee in the nearby restaurant, but at the
time the employees of the service station left, and at the
last time we know of this employee prior to the explosion, no gasoline was escaping. From that moment on, as
far as the evidence in this case is concerned, Clayton
Webb could have been and \vas with his equipment. At
this point the trial court allowed the jury to speculate and
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conjecture concerning the location and the activity of the
deceased employee. This, of course, has never been allowed by this court as set forth in a series of cases which
have been definite, well-defined a.nd uniform regarding the
problem of conjecture and speculation in attempting to
prove negligent acts and the causation factor. These
cases are as follows:

Spackman v. Ben,efit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 97
Utah 91, 89 P. 2d 490.
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.
2d 680.
Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. 2d 566.
Olsen v. Warwood, 123 Utah 111, 255 P. 2d 725.
Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P. 2d 178.
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986.
Illustrative of all these cases we quote from the language in Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, 103 Utah 44, 132 P.
2d 680, as follows :
''While deductions may be based on probabilities, the evidence must do more than merely raise
a conjecture or show a probability. Where there
are probabilities the other way equally or more
potent the deductions are mere guesses and the
jury should not be permitted to speculate. The
rule is well established in this jurisdiction that
where 'the proximate cause of the injury is left to
conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of
law.' Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189,
170 P. 80, 84; Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 70
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· Utah 72, 257 P. 1066. Mariy cases are cited in support of this proposition and the court quoted with
approval from 29 Cyc. 625 where it is stated : 'The
evidence . must, however, do more than merely
raise a conjecture or show a probability as to the
cause of the injury, and no recovery can be had if
the· evidence leaves it to conjecture which of two
probable causes resulted in the injury, where defendant was liable for only one of them.' ''
Other than the unfounded assumptions of the trial
court and jury it could just as well be assumed that the
deceased driver was at the place of the unloading operation and had no knowledge of any escaping gasoline or
fumes. In this regard the evidence showed that the truck
was alongside the building or shed, and that there was a
wall between the truck and the tank and its pump. It is
further just as consistent to assume that at the time of
the explosion· the deceased was engaged in doing everything he could under what circumstances were present.
In applying the law the trial court failed and refused
to apply the assumption, in absence of any substantial
evidence, that the deceased employee was exercising due
care as required by the case of Meacham v. Allen, 1 Utah
2d 79, 262 Pac. 2d 285, as follows :
"From the basic fact that a human being was accidentally killed a preumption arises which required
the trier of the facts to assume the presumed facts,
that decedent used due care for his own safety, in
the abence of a prima facie showing to the contrary. * * * ''
20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Also Holla;nd v. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah
2d 303, 293 Pac. 2d 700:
''If one surveys the picture through the eyes of
suspicion with a preconceived notion that he connived with Moreton, it is possible to create a fabric
of conjecture upon which to believe that Mathesius
wilfully assisted Moreton in deceiving the Hollands. But it seems to me that if one is willing to
indulge the presumption of right conduct, until
some evidence definitely indicatingthe contrary is
shown, which presumption Mathesius is entitled to
have indulged in his behalf. * * *"
To paraphrase the Holland case, one must need be
engaged in a preconceived suspicion concerning the activities of the deceased driver. It seems to defendant that if
the Court is willing to indulge the preumption of right
conduct, which the deceased is entitled to, that his activities are understandable on the basis of non-negligence.
Again, there is no susbtantial evidence of any kind to
destroy these preumptions.
Appellant recognizes the fact that in deciding the
motions discussed, the court was required to look at the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
However, this rule has never been regarded nor used to
furnish evidence necessary to a plaintiff's cause of action.
It has never substituted for the failure to present evidence
material to a cause of action nor evidence which fails to
meet the criteria of the Sumsion case.
The nearest that plaintiff came to proving causation
was by the testimony of respondent's expert, Dr. Bryner:
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'' Q. Where the, how this mixture got in the air at

a certain place inside the storage

house~

''A. Well, as I see it there are two possible
sources. Either from a leaky fitting or poor
connection on the pump. Or an over flow of
the tank.
'' Q. Is one as likely as the other in your

mind~

''A. There is a good possibility that one would be
just as good as the other because I don't
know. Have any testimony as to whether the
tank was full or not~ That just, I've heard
that the, they measure the gas before they
put it in. (Tr. 177)
* * * * *
"Q. But, perhaps I am repeating myself, and I
want to make it definitely clear that the possibility of the source (Tr. 178), or reaction
that might explode, creating a condition that
would explode would be either leaky and improper fittings on the pump or overflowing~
''A. Or the, it could be on the hose connection is
what I made it out to be a possibility. I don't
know.
'' Q. And you say one is just as possible as the
other~

''A. The gasoline got out there, that's all I know.
(Tr. 179)
* * * * *
'' Q. What I am trying to get is do you have any
idea of the specific source~
"A. I don't think I'd venture an opinion on just
exactly how it was ignited. There are possibilities, but the exact way it was ignited,
there are several ways it possibly could. Cigarette, or22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'' Q. I am speaking, you have forgotten I said from
the facts you know in this case. ( Tr. 181)
''A. Yes.

'' Q. And I gather you have no idea of the source
of the ignition 1
"A. Well what you want me to say is that the
motor that ignited it, but -

'' Q. Please don't do that to me. I'm not asking
you to say anything-.
" A. But I wouldn't say that because.

"Q. I want to clear that up, Doctor, I'm asking
you to say what is in your mind.
''A. Well my mind-

'' Q. I don't appreciate that inference.
"A. I don't have an opinion as to exactly what
ignited it.

'' Q. And all you can do in regard to the source of
ignition would engage in conjecture and
speculation, is that right 1
"A. That's right. (Tr. 182)
This Court, as late as August 15, 1960, in the case of
Price v. Ashley's, Inc. ______ Utah ______ , 354 P. 2d 1064, again
reasserted the principle of law involved in this case.
''With two or more possible causes such as an
inattentive driver and a mechanical defect that
would have made it harder to turn proof that it
may have been either is not proof that it was in
fact either. No evidence indicated that either cause
was the more probable.''
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As the evidence was concluded in this case the appellant submits that the substantial evidence was as
follows:
(a) The tanker was hooked up to the pumping operations and the pumping operations were started.
(b) The appellant's employee Clayton Webb, deceased, was seen in the nearby restaurant having a cup
of coffee.
(c) After appellant's employee was seen having his
coffee, employees of respondent passed the pumping
operations and there was no evidence of escaping
gasoline.
(d) Sometime later when the explosion occurred, the
appellant's employee was in and about his equipment and
the place of the unloading operation.
(e) That the explosion was caused by the white gas
in a vapor form and was more probably ignited by the
dangerous and unsafe electrical motor operating the
pump.
It is submitted from this state of the evidence that
the trial. court should have granted appellant's motions
above mentioned.
PoiNT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.6 (R. 43), TO THE GIVING OF
WHICH APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND
WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:
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''If you find and believe by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the escape of white
gasoline from any of the facillties used in transferring the same from the trailer tank of the
Defendants to the tank of the Plaintiffs resulted
from negligence on the part of Clayton Webb,
the employee of the Defendants, and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of one or more
explosions and fire resulting in damage to the
Plaintiffs, it is of no consequence that you do not
determine the exact point at which the gasoline
escaped, nor the exact manner in which it was
ignited. If your minds are so satisfied by a fa;i.r
preponderance of the evidence, then you should
find a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs and
against the Defendants unless your minds are
also satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence in one or more of the particulars
set in Instruction No. 3." (Emphasis supplied)
The practical and reasonable effect was to tell the
jury that it was of no importance to them as to the manner in which gasoline escaped or how the fumes were
ignited. This, of course, was the specific problem of the
entire lawsuit. It is of interest to note that in the case of
Hooper v. General Motors Corporation, 123 Utah 515, 260
Pac. 2d 549, that this court held the following instruction
erroneous and prejudicial :
" 'You are instructed that the fact that the
rim and spider were found in a separated condition after the accident is no evidence of the fact
that they were defective, unsound or unsafe when
assembled and sold by defendant, General Motors
Corporation, nor is it evidence of the fact that the
separating of the rim and spider caused the truck
to go out of control and overturn.' '' (Emphasis
supplied)
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It appears to appellant that Instruction No. 6 has
the identical effect as the instruction in the Hooper case.
Paraphrasing this case, the instruction No.6 as given by
the court withdrew from the jury facts which involved two
requisite elements of plaintiff's cause.

PoiNT

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTION NO. 9 (R. 35), TO WHICH FAILURE
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH
READS AS FOLLOWS:
''Based upon the commonly known fact that
the instinct for self-preservation is such that
persons use ordinary and reasonable care for
their own safety, the law permits you to assume
that Clayton Webb, deceased, at the time of and
immediately.preceding the incident in question,
was exercising due care for his own safety. You
may make findings in accordance therewith unless you are persuaded from a preponderance of
the evidence that he was guilty of negligence as
elsewhere in these instructions defined.''
The court will note from the Statement of Facts that
the appellant's agent and employee was burned to death
in this accident without being able to relate his knowleoge of the occurrence. The requested instruction was
taken from instruction form No. 16.8 of Jury Instruction
Forms, Utah, and the cases cited thereunder. In refusing this instruction, and reading the court's instructions
as a whole, the trial court not only failed to advise the
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jury as to this assumption, but, in effect, advised them
that they could assume the opposite; that is, that in absence of any substantial evidence the jury could assume
that the deceased was careless and negligent. The cases
cited under the above-mentioned form 16.8 are as follows:

Tuttle v. P. I. E., 121 Utah 420, 242 P. 2d 764.
Lewis v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97.
Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285.

PoiNT

V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTION NO. 10 (R. 36), TO WHICH FAILURE
APPELLANT EXCEPTED (Tr. 194) AND WHICH
READS AS FOLLOWS:
''You are instructed that where the precise
cause of an accident on the whole evidence is left
to conjecture or speculation, and which may be
reasonably attributed to causes over which this
defendant had no control, as to a cause for which
this defendant would be responsible, then and in
that event the plaintiff has failed to sustain its
burden of proof, and if such you find the fact
to be your verdict should be in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of action.''
This point has been substantially argued under
Points I and II, and appellant again adopts the law and
cases set forth in those points. The requested instruction, in substance, is set forth in Form 2.3 of Jury Instruction Forms, Utah.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent has wholly and totally failed to establish
the fact of negligence and proximate causation. If any
explanation was given for the explosion occurrence it was
done by appellants on a basis of freedom from negligence. As evidence was concluded, respondent failed to
prove, e.ven by any reasonable inference, the cause of the
explosion, or any acts of commission or omission of
appellant to establish any cause or relation between the
alleged negligent acts and explosion. In this case the
jury did nothing more than to engage in the wildest kind
of speculation, surmise and conjecture.
The instructions. complained of in the case were of no
assistance to the jury and could not establish any reasonable set of standards by which the evidence could be
adjudged, but, on the contrary, tended to confuse the
proper applicable legal principles. Appellant submits the
trial court erred in the various rulings and acts set forth
herein and presented and argued.

Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM,
Attorneys for Appella;nt

307 Utah Oil Bldg.,
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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